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INTRODUCTION
In 1965, Illinois' became the second state' to broaden the scope
of its long arm statute3 to encompass divorce jurisdiction., Under
that amendment, an individual filing for divorce in Illinois could
obtain in personam jurisdiction over an absent spouse,5 if the defen-
dant either maintained a marital domicile in Illinois at the time the
cause of action arose, or committed an act within the state which
created the cause of action. To clarify and broaden the scope, of this
provision, the 1977 Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act7 again amended the long arm statute. The Act deleted both the
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1) (1975), provides:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person
or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits
such person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of
such acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this State;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(c) The ownership, use or possession of any real estate situated in this
State;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this
State at the time of contracting;
(e) With respect to actions of divorce and separate maintenance, the main-
tenance in this State of a matrimonial domicile at the time the cause of
action arose or the commission in this State of any act giving rise to the cause
of action.
2. In 1964, Kansas became the first state to incorporate a marital litigation provision in
its long arm statute. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308 (b)(8) (1976). See Friedman, Extension of the
Illinois Long Arm Statute: Divorce and Separate Maintenance, 16 DE PAUL L. REv. 45, 45
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Friedman].
3. The term "long arm statute" refers to a statute enabling the courts of a particular state
to obtain in personam jurisdiction over non-resident defendants when they are beyond the
state's borders. The assertion of jurisdiction is usually predicated on the commission of
certain acts within the state, or the maintenance of certain relations within the state. See
generally M. GREEN, BASIC CMvL PROCEDURE 30-36 (1972); Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or
Causing Consequences as a Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. REv. 249 (1959).
4. "Divorce jurisdiction" is used to refer to a state's power to adjudicate marital relation-
ships and the incidental obligations which arise from those relationships.
5. "Absent spouse" is used to describe a marital partner who has abandoned the state
where his co-partner resides, with the intention to remain outside of that state.
6. Cf. Lefkovitz v. Lefkovitz, 341 So. 2d 253 (Fla. App. 1976) (restrictively interpreting
the 1965 amendment and refusing to give full faith and credit to an Illinois divorce decree
based on long arm jurisdiction).
7. Pub. Act 80-923, 1977 II1. Legis. Serv. 1640 (West) (to be codified as ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 40, §§ 101-802). The long arm amendment is contained in § 904 of the Act. Section 904 is
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language referring to the commission of an act giving rise to the
cause of action and the domicile clause's time limitation. Thus, in
Illinois, the only substantive, statutory prerequisite to assertion of
jurisdiction over an absent, non-resident defendant in an action for
divorce is the maintenance, at any time, of a marital domicile
within the state.
This article will examine the problems in interpreting and apply-
ing the amended provision. After establishing a framework for con-
stitutional analysis, this article will then measure the Illinois stat-
ute against the approaches taken by other states. Finally, alterna-
tives to the present language will be suggested.
BACKGROUND
Proper analysis of the application of the concept of long-arm juris-
diction in marital relationship adjudication requires an overview of
the general topic of divorce jurisdiction. The power of a state to
adjudicate matters concerning an individual's marital relationship
is not predicated solely upon its in personam jurisdiction over the
relevant parties.' The common notion has been9 that, in determin-
ing whether to dissolve a marriage, the state exercises jurisdiction
not over the parties themselves,'" but over the intangible marital
status.
The United States Supreme Court, in the landmark decision of
Williams v. North Carolina," endorsed this characterization. Mrs.
Williams had filed for divorce, but could not legally compel her
currently § 17(1)(e) of the Civil Practice Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(e) (1976). As
amended, it provides:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person
or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits
such person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of
such acts:
(e) With respect to actions of divorce and separate maintenance, the main-
tenance in this State of a matrimonial domicile.
8. While this concept is most clearly identified with Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S.
287 (1942) (Williams I), judicial recognition of the notion can be traced to Haddock v.
Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 624-25 (1906), which was overruled by Williams I.
9. Divorce actions were traditionally characterized as in rem because the court was taking
jurisdiction over a status. This approach was spefically repudiated by the Supreme Court in
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906). Although Haddock was expressly overruled in
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (Williams I), Justice Douglas, writing for
the majority, approved the use of the term "status" to classify such actions. Id. at 298, 304.
10. "Hence, the decrees in this case, like other divorce decrees, are more than inpersonam
judgments." Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942) (Williams I).
11. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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husband's appearance in court.'2 The Court held that since jurisdic-
tion is exercised over the status, ' ' it is unnecessary that both parties
appear for a court to modify that status.'4 Thus, to justify ex parte
divorce jurisdiction, the appearing party need only establish the
requisite relationship between the marital status and the forum
state-bona fide'" domicile within the jurisdiction.'" The other re-
quirements for a valid decree are adequate notice to the defendant
and an opportunity for him to be heard.'7 Thus Williams permits ex
parte divorces without in personam jurisdiction over an absent
spouse.'"
The Need for Long Arm Jurisdiction
In Marital Proceedings
Williams does not resolve all jurisdictional issues in marital litiga-
tion, for numerous rights and obligations'" accompany the marital
12. Both spouses were residents of North Carolina. Mrs. Williams went to Nevada to
obtain a divorce, serving process upon Mr. Williams in North Carolina. Mr. Williams was
not amenable to the service, as Nevada had no applicable long arm statute. Consequently,
he refused to appear and answer in Nevada.
13. The only question addressed by the Supreme Court was the state's power to dissolve
the marital status.
14. "Thus it is plain that each state, by virtue of its command over its domiciliaries and
its large interest in the institution of marriage, can alter within its own borders the marriage
status of the spouse domiciled there, even though the other spouse is absent." 317 U.S. at
298, 299 (emphasis added). The paramount rationale of Williams v. North Carolina is that
the primary restraint on the state's power derives from the doctrine of federalism, and not
from due process. See Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 16 (1954) (Clark, J.,
dissenting); Rheinstein, Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CI. L. REv. 775, 779-80
(1955). But see Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), where divorce jurisdiction was
invalidated on due process grounds. The decision in Alton is, however, somewhat unclear and
difficult to rationalize with prior law. Both parties were present at the proceeding, and the
basic issue was whether they were in fact bona fide domiciliaries of the jurisdiction. Since
both parties appeared, the only "person" who would have been deprived of anything by a
finding of invalid domicile was the state in which the parties were domiciliaries. Thus, if one
state improperly adjudiciates the rights of parties which should be determined by another
state, the problem is actually one of federalism, relating to the state's power and its territorial
limits. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877).
15. In Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (Williams II), the holding in
Williams I was qualified in that the first state's finding as to the bona fide nature of the
domicile could be questioned by the state to which an application for full faith and credit
had been made.
16. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942) (Williams I).
17. Id. at 299. Although the opinion refers to Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940),
rehearing denied, 312 U.S. 712 (1940), which required a minimum of service by publication,
it is likely that Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) which
requires a form of notice most likely to afford actual notice, is now applicable.
18. Personal jurisdiction cannot be questioned if the divorce is not ex parte, since both
parties are present and submit to the jurisdiction of the court.
19. These rights and obligations include the right to be man and wife under the law, child
custody, property rights and the right to support.
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relationship. The Supreme Court held 0 in Estin v. Estin2' that since
these privileges are considerably more personal than the shared
marital status, the Williams jurisdictional standard provides an
insufficient basis for adjudicating those rights.2" Moreover, property
aspects23 of the marital relationship involve the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause as the predominant limitation on a court's
exercise of jurisdiction.2 1 Since most divorce litigation concerns not
only dissolution of the marital status, but, perhaps more impor-
tantly, adjudication of property rights,'25 in personam jurisdiction
over an absent spouse is required to determine property interests."
Thus, in absent spouse marital litigation, full resolution of all the
issues requires statutory long arm service to acquire personal juris-
diction over the absent party.
Additionally, long arm jurisdiction serves a practical purpose. In
many instances, because a dependent spouse is financially unable
to file suit in a foreign jurisdiction, the remedies available to that
party are substantially limited.27 In any event, the abandoned indi-
20. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948), could be read to view the problem alternatively
as one of conflict of law. The conflicts approach would apply the law of the absent party's
domiciliary state rendering the ex parte decree binding to the extent mandated by that law.
Id. at 544. The theory is poorly developed in the opinion, and would appear to be repudiated
completely by language in Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957), which speaks of in
personam jurisdiction as a prerequisite to any adjudication. Id. at 418. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court has subsequently denied certiorari to a case decided under the conflict of law
rationale. See Nowell v. Nowell, 157 Conn. 470, 254 A.2d 889, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844
(1969).
21. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948); see also Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S.
416, 418-19 (1954) (affirming a holding that in ex parte divorces in which property rights are
adjudicated, in personam jurisdiction over the absent defendant is required).
22. See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541,
545 (1948). For evidence of such reasoning as early as 1859, see Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582,
588 (1859).
23. The property rights typically involved are the right to financial support and marital
property rights, such as community property, dower, and forced share. See Estin v. Estin,
334 U.S. 541, 548 (1948). The same rationale has been applied to classify child custody rights
as "property" rights, thus requiring in personam jurisdiction over the absent spouse. See May
v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
24. Due process is implicated by the presence of a jeopardized property right of the absent
spouse. It is not clear what effect is to be-given to non-vested, contingent property interests
which are incidental to the marital relationship. A prime example is inchoate dower. For a
case holding that an inchoate dower claim does not deserve extended protection, see Simons
v. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank, 381 U.S. 81 (1965).
25. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948).
26. This concept has long been recognized in Illinois, see, e.g., Gleiser v. Gleiser, 402 Ill.
343, 344, 83 N.E.2d 693, 694 (1949); Kelley v. Kelley, 317 Ill. 104, 107, 147 N.E. 659, 661
(1925); Proctor v. Proctor, 215 Il1. 275, 276, 74 N.E. 145, 145 (1905), and in other states, see,
e.g., Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36 So.2d 236 (1948); Baldwin v. Baldwin, 28 Cal. 2d
406, 412, 170 P.2d 670, 676 (1946).
27. Without jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the alternative remedy was to attach
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vidual should not be forced to pursue his or her spouse to enforce
rights arising from the marriage." Thus a long arm statute affords
an opportunity for a remedy within the forum of marital domicile. 9
This analysis clearly shows the necessity of a divorce provision in a
long arm statuue. A proper provision must be within the constitu-
tional paramaters for long arm jurisdiction in general.
Federalism and Due Process
Two constitutional doctrines-federalism and due pro-
cess-restrain a state's jurisdictional power over individuals who are
neither residents of, nor served with process within, the state. Thus,
a valid state long arm statute must comport with the requirements
of both doctrines. 0 The first concept, federalism, represents a com-
promise whereby independent states reserve their sovereign integ-
rity under the Constitution, while combining for the purpose of
forming an ongoing union of central government.3 The state cannot
exert its power beyond its borders,3" unless the defendant has estab-
lished a connection with the state in some manner, such as resi-
dency.3 3 As society has become more transitory, the notion of sover-
eign state power has been diluted extensively.34 It is no longer neces-
sary for a state to find a non-resident physically within its borders
defendant's property located within the jurisdiction. This, of course, limited recovery and
support payments to the value of that property. See generally Friedman, supra note 2.
28. See Friedman, supra note 2. See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17, at 177 (Smith-
Hurd 1968) (Historical and Practice Notes).
29. Many states now use the words "marital relationship" instead of "marital domicile"
the terminology used in the Illinois statute. See note 1 supra. The distinction can be of critical
importance. See notes 55 through 77 and accompanying text infra.
Prior to 1977 the Illinois long arm statute required that maintenance of the domicile exist
at the time the cause of action arose. See note 1 supra. In addition, the Illinois statute
contained a provision which made the commission within the state of any act giving rise to
the cause of action for divorce a sufficient ground for the application of the long arm statute.
Id. This provision is usually absent from the statutes of other states. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 4.3(A)(8) (Baldwin 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b)(8) (Supp. 1977). The provision
was deleted in Illinois by the 1977 amendment. See note 7 supra.
30. Fisons Limited v. United States, 458 F.2d 1241, 1250-51 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1041 (1972).
31. "No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which
separate the States, and of compounding the American people into one common mass."
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819). "The authority of every tribunal
is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the state in which it is established."
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877).
32. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). To do
so would extend that power into the sphere of another state's sovereign power, thus offending
federalism in the same manner (but not to the same extent) that international relations are
upset when independent nations are involved.
33. See notes 66 and 70 and accompanying text infra.
34. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
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to invoke in personam jurisdiction.15 The basic requirement of feder-
alism is the existence of a nexus between an absent individual and
a state, which renders adjudication in that state at least as appro-
priate as adjudication in the state where the defendant can be
found. 36 Thus, federalism demands at a minimum, that the absent,
non-resident party have some relationship with the state. 7
Such a requisite relationship is similar to, but conceptually dis-
tinct from, the "minimum contacts"3 necessary to satisfy the sec-
ond constitutional constraint, due process of law.3 The threshold
requirement is that minimum contacts exist, for without them, due
process is violated by requiring a defendant to appear and defend
himself in a distant, inconvenient and unjustified forum. 0 Due pro-
cess also carries with it the procedural requirements of adequate
notice and opportunity to be heard,4 but such aspects are easily
satisfied once it is determined that the court has the power to issue
such notice.
Thus, the due process minimum contacts analysis is more com-
plex than the minimal relationship inquiry of federalism.42 This
analysis emphasizes the "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice. 41 3 That determination requires balancing such fac-
tors as the nature and extent of the defendant's contacts with the
state," the competing interests of the parties in having claims liti-
gated in a particular forum,45 and the interest of the state in provid-
ing the plaintiff with an effective means of redress." If these factors
35. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see generally M. GREEN,
BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 26-30 (1972).
36. Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
37. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see also Shaffer v.
Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2584-85 (1977) ("We therefore conclude that all assertions of state
court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International
Shoe and its progeny.") (footnote omitted). Shaffer limited in rem attachments to cases
where the suit bore the "minimum contacts" relationship to the defendant's ownership of the
property.
38. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
39. Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
40. See Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 384-89, 143 N.E.2d 673, 676-79 (1957).
41. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). State statutes
typically provide for service of process beyond the state's borders. Such service is given the
same force and effect as service within the state, provided the necessary relationship exists
between the state and the person served, e.g., residence or other submission to the jurisdiction
of the state. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 16(1) (1975).
42. See Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 384-89, 143 N.E.2d 673, 676-79 (1957).
43. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
44. See Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 251-53 (1958); Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952).
45. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-24 (1957); Traveller's
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1950).
46. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-24 (1957); see also Nelson
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weigh too harshly against the asserted jurisdiction, the state has no
power to determine the claim. 7 Long arm statutes typically meet 9
this due process requirement by making the exercise of jurisdiction
dependent upon the defendant's commission of certain acts within
the state.49
Under the Illinois long arm statute, the act providing divorce
jurisdiction is the maintenance of a marital domicile within the
state. 0 Originally, section 17(1)(e) of the Illinois Civil Practice Act
contained the requirment that domicile exist in Illinois at the time
the cause of action for divorce arose.5 However, the few cases that
interpreted this provision were inconsistent52 and frought with mis-
interpretations.5 3 To clarify the disparity, the 1977 amendment de-
leted the phrase italicized above.54 Although well-intentioned, this
simplification fails in its primary purpose of clarifying the statute;
indeed, it may even add to the confusion in this area. Furthermore,
it may exceed the constitutional limitations on long arm jurisdic-
tion.
v. Miller, 11 111. 2d 378, 384, 143 N.E.2d 673, 676 (1957).
47. See Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569,
2582-85 (1977).
48. See generally Cleary and Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois Courts,
50 Nw. L. REv. 599 (1955); Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended
Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533.
49. The Illinois long arm statute is typical. Section 17(1) conditions long arm jurisdiction
upon the doing of certain enumerated acts by any person within the state, or his personal
representative, whether or not a citizen of the state. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1) (1975).
The "acts" most commonly used are the transaction of any business within the state, the
commission of a tortious act within the state, the ownership, use or possession of any real
property within the state, and the contracting to insure any persons, property or risks located
within the state.
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(e) (1975). Prior to 1977, this subsection of the statute
included the commission within the state of any act giving rise to the divorce action. See note
1 supra. This clause could easily foster interpretive problems, both in no-fault divorce states,
and in fault states with grounds such as repeated mental cruelty. The fact that most states
have now adopted no-fault divorce statutes is one explaination for the conspicuous absence
of such a clause in other long arm statutes with provisions for divorce jurisdiction. See, e.g.
IDAHO CODE § 5-514(e) (Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1701.03(a)(7) (West Supp.
1977-1978); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 247.057 (West Supp. 1977-1978). The 1977 amendment deleted
this provision. See note 7 supra.
51. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(e) (1975). For text, see note 1 supra.
52. See Lefkovitz v. Lefkovitz, 341 So. 2d 253 (Fla. App. 1976); Farah v. Farah, 25 Ill.
App. 3d 481, 323 N.E.2d 361 (1975); Nickas v. Nickas, 113 N.H. 261, 306 A.2d 51 (1973).
53. See Lefkovitz v. Lefkovitz, 341 So. 2d 253 (Fla. App. 1976) (holding no domicile
maintained in Illinois when cause of action arose, where husband left the state to relocate
his business and continued to support his family in Illinois and make payments on house
located there); Nickas v. Nickas, 113 N.H. 261, 306 A.2d 51 (1973) (holding domicile main-
tained in Illinois where husband, New Hampshire resident, lived with his wife in Illinois for
only three weeks before abandoning her and returning to New Hampshire).
54. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977). For the full text see note
7 supra.
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PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE 1977 AMENDMENT TO THE ILLINOIS LONG
ARM STATUTE
Interpretational
Utilization of domicile as a basis of jurisdiction under the Illinois
long arm statute promotes needless confusion. Due to its abstract
nature and its similarity to the related concept of residence,5 domi-
cile has been inconsistently interpreted and applied by the courts."
Although their basic elements are similar, i.e., physical presence at
a site and an intention to remain indefinitely, domicile and resi-
dence are commonly held to embody different concepts. 7 Domicile
denotes more than the intention to remain in one place in that it
usually refers to an intention to make a place one's permanent and
primary" "home," the center of daily activities and relationships.5"
Unfortunately, this logical construct has been clouded by case
law. 0 Courts, seeking to reach a desired end, have often tailored the
definition of domicile to conform to the character of the perceived
inquiry. 61 This judicial tampering has resulted in holdings that an
individual simultaneously has more than one domicile and more
than one residence, all at different locations." Further, in Illinois,
residence and domicile have often been viewed by the courts as
indistinguishable,"3 but at other times have been held to be different
concepts.6 ' Consequently, it is often difficult to make a precise de-
55. See Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953); Keck v. Keck, 56 Ill. 2d 508, 514, 309
N.E.2d 217, 220 (1974).
56. Compare Lefkovitz v. Lefkovitz, 341 So. 2d 253 (Fla. App. 1976), with Nickas v.
Nickas, 113 N.H. 261, 306 A.2d 51 (1973). The inconsistencies indicate that there is no single,
unequivocal definition of the term "domicile." A. EHRENZWEIG, CoNFtUcr OF LAWS 240 (1962);
Reese, Does Domicile Bear a Single Meaning?, 55 COLUM. L. Rav. 589 (1955).
57. Cf. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, rehearing denied, 312 U.S. 712 (1940) (domicile
as a basis for jurisdiction); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (residence as a
permissible grounds for jurisdiction)..
58. See Hughes v. Ill. Public Aid Comm., 2 I1. 2d 374, 380, 118 N.E.2d 14, 17-18 (1954).
Thus, one may have more than a single residence, yet maintain a single domicile, as the
intention necessary for domicile is of a more permanent nature.
59. Id; see also Stilwell v. Continental Ill. Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 31111. 2d 546,
202 N.E.2d 477 (1964); H. CLARK, LAw OF DoMEsTIc RmATIONS 144-47 (1968).
60. See, e.g., In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303 (1932); Dorrance v. Thayer-
Martin, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 A. 601 (1934), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 678 (1935). This complex
estate administration determined that a decedent's domicile could be located in numerous
sites at given times, depending on the present intent of the decedent at those times.
61. See Berlingieri v. Berlingieri, 372 111. 60, 22 N.E.2d 675 (1939); see also A. EHERNZWEIG,
CONFLICr OF LAws 240-44 (1962).
62. See Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 424-28 (1938) (holding that the limitation on
finding that an individual has more than one domicile is only a theoretical fiction; in practice
that fiction may be ignored).
63. Garrison v. Garrison, 107 111. App. 2d 311, 246 N.E.2d 9 (1969).
64. Berlingieri v. Berlingieri, 372 Ill. 60, 22 N.E.2d 675 (1939).
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termination as to when and where an individual maintains a domi-
cile.
An attempt to ascertain the locus of a marital domicle presents
additional complications. The common law approach dictates that
the husband's domicile is also that of the wife. 5 Despite some senti-
ment for change,"6 this is still the basic rule in Illinois"7 and other
jurisdictions.6s
Strict application of the rule leads to hardship and confusion
when a husband establishes a new domicile in a foreign jurisdiction
after separating from his wife: a subsequent proceeding by the wife
in which jurisdiction is based on marital domicile must be brought
in the foreign jurisdiction. The earliest judicial attempt to alleviate
this problem was the determination of domicile on the basis of fault;
marital domicile followed a departing husband only if he left
"without fault.""9 This scheme created more problems than it
solved, and the United States Supreme Court eventually invalida-
ted the approach.70
Subsequently, some courts view a husband's departure, without
first having obtained a divorce, as temporary and without effect
upon the situs of the marital domicile.7 Other jurisdictions, includ-
ing Illinois, suggest that the common law rule does not apply after
separation.12 The married woman may then acquire her own domi-
cile. If she remains at the last domicile shared with her husband,
that situs may be designated the "surviving" marital domicile.73
However, this analysis creates problems similar to those of the in-
validated "fault" approach,7" in that determination of domicile may
depend on matters going to the substance of the litigation. Also, it
65. Cooper v. Beers, 143 Ill. 25, 33 N.E. 61 (1892).
66. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) Ov CONFLICT OF LAws § 77, Comment c (1971) (defining
marital domicile as the place where the spouses were domiciled when they last lived together).
Of course, if the Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution were to be enacted, it would
invalidate the common law distinction.
67. Crawley v. Bauchens, 13 Ill. App. 3d 791, 300 N.E.2d 603 (1973), aff'd, 57 Ill. 2d 360,
312 N.E.2d 236 (1974).
68. See, e.g., In re Estate of Daniels, 53 Wis. 2d 611, 193 N.W.2d 847 (1972).
69. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
70. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). See also Haddock v. Haddock,
201 U*S. 562 (1906), for a complete discussion of the fault approach.
71. See Julson v. Julson, 255 Iowa 301, 122 N.W.2d 329 (1963); Sampsell v. Superior
Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948); Cohn v. Cohn, 327 Ill. App. 22, 63 N.E.2d 618
(1945).
72. See Bateman v. Bateman, 337 Ill. App. 7, 85 N.E.2d 196 (1949).
73. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 77 Comment c (1971).
74. See text accompanying notes 79 and 80 supra. The problem was that in order to
establish jurisdiction, the court had to determine matters that were the substance of the
litigation.
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is equally appropriate to hold that the marital domicile ceases to
exist upon separation.
Therefore, the basic problem is the confusion generated by the use
of a concept as vague as marital domicile as a foundation for a
jurisdictional statute, particularly a statute that becomes relevant
only upon separation or divorce. The foregoing interpretations of
marital domicile are not definitive and can not be relied upon to
produce consistent and just results. Indeed, as the situation stands,
much depends upon the particular tribunal determining the matter
and its perception of the state's policies."
There are primarily two ways in which the interpretational diffi-
culties of section 17(1)(e) could be corrected. First, the term
"marital domicile" could be deleted and a new concept substituted
in its place. This approach has been followed in many other states
having statutes similar to Illinois'.7" The Illinois legislature, however
adopted a second method by eliminating the language concerning
maintenance of a marital domicile "at the time the cause of action
arose."" This solution raises serious questions regarding whether
and to what extent simple maintenance of a marital domicile satis-
fies the dual constitutional requirements for long arm jurisdiction.
75. For example, in Nickas v. Nickas, 113 N.H. 261, 306 A.2d 51 (1973), the defendant
husband, a New Hampshire resident, had come to Illinois to marry an Illinois resident. After
living together for three weeks in Illinois he deserted his wife and returned to New Hampshire.
After serving process upon her husband under § 17(1)(e), the wife secured a default divorce
and property settlement decree. Without hesitation, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held
that the decree was entitled to full faith and credit since the marital domicile existed in
Illinois at the time the cause of action arose.
In contrast, in Lefkovitz v. Lefkovitz, 341 So. 2d 253 (Fla. App. 1976), the parties were
married in Illinois in 1966 and lived there until 1971, during which time they had three
children. Late in 1971, Mr. Lefkovitz departed to Florida to open a business, planning to have
his family join him there at a later date. During the next two years, Mr. Lefkovitz periodically
returned to Illinois to live with Mrs. Lefkovitz and continued the mortgage payments on the
house. However, in November of 1973, Mr. Lefkovitz decided never to return to his home in
Illinois, and his wife subsequently learned he had been living with another woman in Florida.
Mrs. Lefkovitz instituted Illinois divorce proceedings, basing jurisdiction over her husband
on § 17(1)(e) and obtained a decree in her favor.
In a three paragraph opinion, the Florida Court of Appeals held that no marital domicile
had been maintained in Illinois by Mr. Lefkovitz at the time the cause of action arose, since
no cause of action arose until Mrs. Lefkovitz discovered the adultery in 1973, and since Mr.
Lefkovitz had ceased to maintain a marital domicile in Illinois upon his decision never to
return there. This narrow reading of the 1965 Illinois statute, is due at least in part to the
lack of a concrete definition for the term "marital domicile." For a critique of the majority
opinion see Lefkovitz v. Lefkovitz, 341 So. 2d. 253, 254 (Fla. App. 1976) (Smith, J., dissent-
ing).
76. See notes 101 through 117 and accompanying text infra.
77. See notes 1 and 7 supra; see. also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(l)(e) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1977).
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Constitutionality
Domicile, like residence, is a traditional basis for jurisdiction over
absent parties, so long as that fact exists at the time jurisdiction is
asserted.78 The 1965 long arm statute79 permitted the exercise of
jurisdiction over an absent spouse on the condition that the marital
domicile had been maintained in Illinois at time the cause of action
arose. However, the 1977 amendment, 0 in effect, establishes that a
sufficient basis for in personam jurisdiction exists if a marital domi-
cile was ever maintained in Illinois.
The use of a hypothetical situation will facilitate the analysis of
the issue raised by the amendment. Husband and Wife marry in the
state of Virginia, live there for six years, and have two children.
After residing in a number of states, the family moves to Chicago,
Illinois, where they rent an apartment and live for approximately
one year. Pursuant to a permanent employment transfer, the family
moves to Gary, Indiana, intending to live there indefinitely. After
three years, Husband deserts his family and returns to Virginia. One
year later, Wife and the children return to Chicago, Illinois, where
Wife signs a one year lease and enrolls her children in the public
schools. Wife secures an Illinois divorce and property settlement
decree after serving process upon Husband in Virginia pursuant to
the amended section 17(1)(e). Thereupon, Wife seeks full faith and
credit for the Illinois judgment in Virginia.
Assuming section 17(1)(e) is valid in its present form, there is
little Husband can do to attack the Illinois decree. He cannot object
to the retroactive application of the long arm statute, for such an
application offends neither the United States Constitution,' nor the
law of Illinois. 2 The argument that the provision was meant to
apply only to those maintaining a domicile in Illinois when the
78. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, rehearing denied, 312 U.S. 712 (1940)
(domicile); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-39 (1932) (residence).
79. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(e) (1975). For the text of the statute see note 1 supra.
80. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977). For the text of the
statute see note 7 supra.
81. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 544 (1949).
82. The law applicable in the State of Illinois is that there is no vested right in
any particular remedy or method of procedure, and that, while generally statutes
will not be construed to give them a retroactive operation unless it clearly appears
that such was the legislative intent, never the less, when a change of law merely
affects the remedy or law of procedure, all rights of action will be enforcible under
the new procedure without regard to whether they accrued before or after such
change of law and without regard to whether the suit has been instituted or not,
unless there is a saving clause as to existing litigation.
Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill. 591, 597, 114 N.E.2d 686, 690 (1953); accord, Nelson v. Miller, 11
Ill. 2d 378, 382, 143 N.E.2d 673, 676 (1957).
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cause of action for divorce arose also fails for this construction reads
in the exact language eliminated by the amendment. Thus, Illinois
law resurrects the home husband thought he had abandoned in
Illinois, since no express language in the long arm statute prevents
its application to the hypothetical situation. Thus, this result would
be constitutionally invalid, for it clearly fails to satisfy due process
and probably cannot even meet the less demanding standard for
federalism.
The lack of any meaningful relationship between the defendant
and the forum state, would render adjudication in the forum less
appropriate than would be adjudication in another state, where a
significant relationship might exist. This conflict between forum
states is based on federalism. Due process, on the other hand, enters
into the conflict between the defendant and a forum state, assuring
the defendant that he need not be forced to litigate in a distant,
inconvenient and inappropriate forum. The due process constraint
requires an even stricter standard than does federalism, i.e., a quali-
tative analysis of the relationship or "contacts" between the defen-
dant and the forum state. As the satisfaction of these requirements
would thus ensure that the minimal requisite relationship standard
of federalism was present, the following analysis will be in terms of
what changes would be necessary to satisfy due process.
Conduct within the state that satisfies the minimum contacts
standards is the justification for a state's exercise of long arm juris-
diction. Such conduct consists of the performance of certain acts
within a state that are sufficiently significant to subject the defen-
dant to the legal authority of that state, for purposes of a cause of
action arising from those acts.13 The conduct most commonly estab-
lishing jurisdiction 4 includes doing business 5 or committing a tor-
tious act" within the state. There is, however, a substantial differ-
ence between these acts and the nature of the conduct on which
jurisdiction is based in the hypothetical situation. The "activity"
83. "The spirit and intent of par. 17 [of the long arm statute] is to provide for jurisdiction
in Illinois courts over nonresidents who commit acts within the state boundaries that give
rise to causes of action against them." Donlon v. Miller, 42 Ill. App. 3d 64, 73, 355 N.E.2d
195, 201 (1976).
84. The Illinois statute is typical in this regard. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(a)
and (b) (1975). A secondary limitation is usually written into the long arm statute. Hence,
the language of the Illinois statute provides, in pertinent part: "Any person . . . who...
does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person. . . to the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of such acts
. . . . ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1) (1975) (emphasis added).
85. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
86. See Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 11. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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therein is the maintenance of a marital family unit within the state
for a brief portion of the duration of the marriage. The cause of
action in question arose after the complete cessation of the conduct
within Illinois. In addition, it is difficult at best to find a causal
relationship between the defendant's activity within the state, and
the subsequent divorce action. The situation differs from an action
for injuries sustained as the result of a defendant's tortious conduct,
or a suit for breach of contract arising out of a defendant's transac-
tion of business. In these situations, the defendant's conduct in-
volves significant contact with the forum state, since the ensuing
cause of action is a direct result of the activity. 7
Section 17(1)(e) lacks a limiting factor which, combined with the
maintenance of a marital domicile within a given state, validates an
assertion of jurisdiction over the party maintaining the domicile. In
all of the cases approving long arm jurisdiction based on the mainte-
nance of a marital domicile, such a limiting factor is present."8 The
most common limiting factor is the abandoned family's uninter-
rupted maintenance of the marital domicile in question, after the
separation which created the cause of action and the need for long
arm jurisdiction." Another factor is the maintenance of a marital
domicile in the state at the time of the conduct responsible for the
divorce proceeding.90 A third limiting factor is that the marital dom-
icile in question be the last shared marital domicile.9 The common
87. See Owens v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 345 P.2d 921
(1959); see generally Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as a Bases of
Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. REv. 249 (1959).
88. See Mizner v. Mizner, 84 Nev. 268, 439 P.2d 679, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847, rehearing
denied, 393 U.S. 972 (1968); see also Mitchum v. Mitchum, 518 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. 1975);
Renwick v. Renwick, 24 Md. App. 277, 330 A.2d 488 (1975); Farah v. Farah, 25 I1. App. 3d
481, 323 N.E.2d 361 (1975); Egbert v. Egbert, 125 N.J. Super. 171, 309 A.2d 746 (Ch. 1973);
Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460 (Okla. 1970); Dillon v. Dillon, 46 Wis. 2d 659, 176 N.W.2d
362 (1970); cf. Soule v. Soule, 193 Cal. App. 2d 443, 14 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 985 (1962) (finding defendant's domicile within the state at the time the divorce
cause of action arose to be a sufficient basis for long arm jurisdiction when coupled with the
fact that the cause of action arose in the state). See also Stucky v. Stucky, 186 Neb. 636, 185
N.W.2d 656, 569 (1971).
89. See Mizner v. Mizner, 84 Nev. 268, 270, 439 P.2d 679, 682, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847,
rehearing denied, 393 U.S. 972 (1968); see also Mitchum v. Mitchum, 518 S.W.2d 362, 366
(Tex. 1976); Renwick v. Renwick, 24 Md. App. 277, 330 A.2d 488 (1975); Farah v. Rarah, 25
Ill. App. 2d 481, 323 N.E.2d 361 (1975); Egbert v. Egbert, 125 N.J. Super 171, 309 A.2d 746
(Ch. 1973); Stucky v. Stucky, 186 Neb. 636, 185 N.W.2d 656 (1971).
90. See Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460 P.2d 460 (Okla. 1970); Soule v. Soule, 193
Cal. App. 2d 443, 14 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962). Note the
similarity between this limiting factor and the one originally incorporated in the Illinois long
arm statute, ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(e) (1975). For the text of the statute see note 1
supra.
91. See Renwick v. Renwick, 24 Md. App. 277, 330 A.2d 488 (1975); Egbert v. Egbert, 125
N.J. Super 171, 309 A.2d 746 (Ch. 1973). Such a limiting factor is also advocated in
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attribute of these limiting factors is that they insure the existence
of a relationship between the defendant and the state sufficient to
warrant the latter's exercise of jurisdiction. The maintenance of the
marital domicile must be more than an incidental or fortuitous
circumstance occurring within the state.
Marital domicile provides a sufficient basis for long arm jurisdic-
tion primarily because of the strong state interest in protecting dom-
iciliaries.92 In the hypothetical, when the spouses mutually aban-
doned the Illinois domicile and moved to Indiana, the abandoned
state lost the requisite interest," and Indiana, the state of their next
permanent domicile, acquired it. Permitting such a long arm-based
divorce and property settlement suit in Illinois would contravene
the restraints of federalism and due process.94 Since the current
Illinois long arm divorce provision contains no limiting factor,95 it
might be read to permit a suit in Illinois on facts similar to those of
the hypothetical situation. The statute therefore contains a poten-
tial constitutional infirmity, because no authority exists for such a
broad, unlimited assertion of long arm jurisdiction."
ALTERNATIVES
The foregoing analysis compels the conclusion that the amended
section 17(1)(e) is deficient in at least two respects. First, the use
of the term "marital domicile" creates interpretational difficulties. 7
Second, section 17(1) (e) lacks a limiting factor to ensure compliance
with the constitutional standards for minimum contacts. 8 These
anomalies are entirely unnecessary, as viable alternatives are avail-
able.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 77, Comment c (1971), which provides; "The
state of matrimonial domicile, which is the state where the spouses were domiciled when they
last lived together as man and wife, should usually at least have jurisdiction to grant support
if the plaintiff spouse has continuously remained domiciled there." (emphasis supplied). This
factor indirectly requires maintenance of the matrimonial domicile in the state at the time
the case of action arose, as the marital relationship and the maintenance of a marital domicile
will tend to terminate simultaneously with the conduct giving rise to the cause of action.
92. "The state of matrimonial domicile has a deep interest in its citizens and a legitimate
purpose in taking steps to preclude their impoverishment." Mizner v. Mizner, 84 Nev. 268,
270, 439 P.2d 679, 680-81 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847, rehearing denied 393 U.S. 972
(1968).
93. Cf Hawes v. Hawes, 130 Ill. App. 2d 546, 263 N.E.2d 625 (1970) (refusing to uphold
asserted long arm jurisdiction based on marital domicile under similar circumstances).
94. See notes 30 through 49 and accompanying text supra.
95. The current provision requires only "the maintenance in this State of a marital domi-
cile." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
96. See cases cited in note 88 supra.
97. See notes 55 through 77 and accompanying text supra.
98. See notes 78 through 96 and accompanying text supra.
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One alternative is judicial clarification and limitation of the pro-
vision. While some of the problems could be corrected in this man-
ner,9" there are numerous reasons for the unacceptability of this
alternative. Judicial construction would be piecemeal, limited in
remedial effect to problems fortuitously raised by aggrieved parties
affected by the statute. Also, there is no guarantee that a particular
court's interpretation would rectify the uncertainty or that uniform-
ity would result. In fact, an imprecise judicial interpretation would
exacerbate the problem. 00 This approach amounts to inefficient
repair work, since the statute's inherent inadequacies create the
need for the judicial grooming.
The most sensible approach is to amend the language of the stat-
ute in a manner effectuating its purpose, while eliminating much of
its current ambiguity. Fortunately, the endeavor need not be a blind
one; the efforts of other jurisdictions provide an excellent catalogue
from which to choose.
Only two of the states with divorce provisions in their long arm
statutes employ the troublesome "marital domicile" language,
Idaho'0' and Illinois. Most other states with similar statutes have
adopted entirely different language. One alternative is the broad,
non-specific approach taken by California and Rhode Island. 02
Those statutes simply provide that courts may exercise jurisdiction
on any basis not inconsistent with the state and federal constitu-
tions. This method is poorly suited to Illinois' revisionary needs, as
it would completely replace all of the current provisions in the long
arm statute. Also, this approach could easily generate much unnec-
essary litigation, in other areas of Illinois long arm jurisdiction now
well settled.0 3
The alternatives adopted by Oklahoma,0 4 Florida,'"5 and Wiscon-
sin, 06 are also inadequate for Illinois' purposes. Although conceiva-
99. An example of this is Weinberger v. Weinberger, 43 Ohio App. 2d 129, 334 N.E.2d
514 (1974), where the court limited a provision in a long arm statute to causes of action
accruing after the effective date of the statute, even though no such restrictive language
appeared in the statute.
100. Cf. Lefkovitz v. Lefkovitz, 341 So. 2d 253 (Fla. App. 1976). which gives an example
of the unpredictability of judicial interpretation of such statutory material. See notes 88
through 93 and accompanying text supra.
101. IDAHO CODE § 5-514(e) (Supp. 1977) provides in pertinent part: "(e) The maintenance
within this state of matrimonial domicile at the time of the commission of any act giving rise
to a cause of action for divorce or separate maintenance."
102. See CAL. Civ. PRo. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (1969).
103. A good example of such litigation is Schoch v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. App. 3d 1200,
90 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1970).
104. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03(a)(7) (West Supp. 1977-1978).
105. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48,193(1)(e) (West 1978).
106. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 247.057 (West Supp. 1977-1978).
1978]
Loyola University Law Journal
bly eliminating some of the interpretational problems in the current
Illinois provision, each statute contains language creating the po-
tential for new interpretational problems. 07 For example,'0 8 Okla-
homa affords divorce long arm jurisdiction when the defendant
maintains "any other relation to this state or to persons or prop-
erty. .. ."0 Florida requires only that the defendant maintain a
matrimonial domicile in the state "at the time of the commence-
ment of the action, or . . . [that] the defendant resided in this
state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabi-
tating during that time or not. . This language is too reminis-
cent of the former Illinois statute, and may create even greater
opportunities for misinterpretation.
Ohio,"' Indiana,"' Kansas,"3 and New Mexico," 4 approach the
problem similarly. The term "domicile" is eliminated, and a limit-
ing factor is provided to ensure that the scope of the statute satisfies
the minimum contacts standard. Thus, the Ohio statute provides a
basis for jurisdiction if the defendant was "living in the marital
relationship within this state notwithstanding subsequent depar-
ture from this state, as to all obligations arising for alimony, cus-
tody, child support, or property settlement, if the other party to the
marital relationship continues to reside in this state.""1
5
Ohio has substituted the term "marital relationship""' for
"marital domicile." Though "marital relationship" is not fully self-
explanatory, still it does not carry the excessive common law bag-
gage associated with the term "domicile.""' 7 Also, the constitution-
ality of the Ohio statute is virtually assured by requiring the plain-
tiffs continued residence in the state. First, the maintenance of the
107. Cf. Lefkovitz v. Lefkovitz, 341 So. 2d 253, 255 n.1 (Fla. App. 1976) (Smith, J.,
dissenting) (alluding to the apparent potential for misunderstanding in the divorce provision
of Florida's long arm statute).
108. Wisconsin makes divorce long arm jurisdiction available when the defendant has
lived in marriage with the plaintiff "for not less than 6 consecutive months within the 6 years
next preceeding the commencement of the actions;. WIs. STAT. ANN., § 247.057 (West
Supp. 1977-1978).
109. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03(a)(7) (West Supp. 1977-1978).
110. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193(1)(e) (West 1978).
111. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4.3(A)(8) (Page 1971).
112. IND. CODE ANN. § 4.4(A)(7) (Burns 1973).
113. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b)(8) (Supp. 1976).
114. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-16(A)(5) (Supp. 1975).
115. OHIo Rxv. CODE ANN. § 4.3(A)(8) (Page 1971).
116. As the meaning of this term is fairly self explanatory, it has been infrequently liti-
gated. A case interpreting the Kansas provision, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b)(8) (Supp. 1976),
limited the term marital relationship to any recognizeable marriage contract, excluding
agreements to enter into the marital relationship. See Whisenant v. Whisenant, 219 Kan. 387,
548 P.2d 470 (1976).
117. See notes 55 through 77 and accompanying text supra.
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marital relationship within the state creates the important state
interest in protecting the individuals involved and tips the mini-
mum contacts analysis in favor of Valid long arm jurisdiction. Sec-
ond, the requirement that the other member of the marital relation-
ship continues to reside in the state ensures that Ohio's interest is
not subordinated to another jurisdiction. Finally, this provision gen-
erally will be operative only if the marital relationship existed in the
state when the cause of action arose, without generating the inter-
pretational difficulties created by the use of express language to that
effect."' Thus, the Ohio provision presents the most satisfactory
alternative."'
CONCLUSION
The 1977 amendment to Illinois' divorce jurisdiction provision of
the long arm statute fails to clarify the statute's inherent ambiguity.
Indeed, it may create even greater problems due to the inconsistent
interpretation of the term "marital domicile." A preferred alterna-
tive would be to amend the language and substitute "marital rela-
tionship" for the term "marital domicile." It is further suggested
that the provision be limited by the requirement that the spouse
bringing suit continues to reside in the state. This approach would
effectuate the purpose of protecting the plaintiff spouse, while mini-
mizing the interpretive difficulties and assuring the statute's consti-
tutionality.
DAVID A. BAKER
118. See note 75 and accompanying text supra. Since this provision requires that the
remaining party plaintiff continues to reside in the state, it is implicit that he or she was
already in the state when the activity leading to the cause of action transpired. Thus, this
added limitation is effectuated without the use of possibly confusing express language to the
same effect.
119. It is further suggested that the language "living in" a marital relationship be re-
placed with "maintenance of" a marital relationship, to prevent difficulty in situations like
that in Lefkovitz v. Lefkovitz, 341 So. 2d 253 (Fla. App. 1976), when a spouse maintains a
marital family unit within a state, but is not physically present.
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